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INTRODUCTION 
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District1 in 1969, courts 
have applied a unique free speech standard to students in public 
schools.  While famously declaring that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,”2 the Court added that student speech that 
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder” is 
subject to discipline.3  Tinker did not intend to apply a material 
disruption standard to speech generally.  Subsequent opinions 
make clear that the standard is unique to students in public 
schools.4  To apply Tinker, then, courts must first resolve the 
“threshold issue” of whether the speech occurred inside or outside 
of school.5  Traditionally, this was a simple task.  Although some 
courts struggled with “underground newspapers” prepared off-
campus and later brought into school,6 the analysis still focused 
primarily on the in-school activity.  Student Internet speech renders 
this threshold question more difficult.  As Internet use continues to 
grow in popularity among school-aged adolescents, courts are 
 
A PDF version of this Note is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2941.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; B.A., Brandeis 
University, 2005.  I would like to thank Professor Abner Greene for his insightful 
comments and for supervising the drafting of this Note.  I would also like to thank 
Professor James Fleming for introducing me to constitutional law in general and First 
Amendment law specifically.  
1  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
2  Id. at 506. 
3  Id. at 513. 
4  See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“[T]he First 
Amendment rights of students in the public schools ‘are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings.’” (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986))). 
5   J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002) 
6  See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 
1998); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. Bd. of 
Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979); see also infra 
Part II.A. 
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called upon to determine whether web activity may constitute on-
campus speech for First Amendment purposes.  In other words, can 
the schoolhouse gate extend online? 
Digital technology, particularly the Internet, permeates almost 
every aspect of the modern adolescent’s life.7  Eighty-seven  
percent of young adults between ages twelve and seventeen use the 
Internet regularly.8  Ninety-three percent have used it at some 
point.9  Of middle- and high-school aged adolescents who use the 
Internet, more than half use online social networking websites,10  
such as MySpace11 and Facebook.12  Studies show that almost half 
of social-network users log in to the network at least once a day.13  
Notably, adolescents use the Internet most frequently at home or at 
school.14  They often use the Internet to publish original material 
as well.15  Weblog software, such as Blogger,16 makes it easy for 
anybody to create and maintain a regularly updated website 
featuring a wide variety of content.   
 
7  See The Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006: Hearing on H.R. 5319 Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Amanda Lenhart, Senior Research Specialist, Pew 
Internet & American Life Project).  
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 
SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITE AND TEENS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (Jan. 3, 2007), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_SNS_Data_Memo_Jan_2007.pdf; see also Dana 
Boyd, Why Youth [Heart] Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in 
Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 123 (David 
Buckingham ed., 2008) (“Social network sites are based around profiles . . . which offer[] 
a description of each member. . . .  [T]he social network site profile also contains 
comments from other members, and a public list of the people that one identifies as 
Friends within the network.”). 
11  MySpace, http://www.myspace.com. 
12  Facebook, http://www.facebook.com. 
13  LENHART & MADDEN, supra note 10, at 2.  
14  Id. at 4–5. 
15  See Student Press Law Center, SPLC Cyberguide: A Legal Manual for Online 
Publishers of Independent Student Websites, http://splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=13. 
16  Blogger, http://www.blogger.com. 
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The near universal access and use of the Internet among 
school-aged adolescents coupled with the tremendous ease of 
creating original expression and distributing that expression makes 
the legal question addressed in this Note a crucial one.  When 
Justice Fortas spoke for the Court in Tinker, he undoubtedly did 
not envision school authorities censoring what students say to each 
other outside of school in local hangouts.  Today, however, what 
students say to each other outside school is often broadcast online 
and may thereby end up on campus.  As the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania noted, “Tinker’s simple armband . . . has been 
replaced by [a] complex multimedia web site, accessible to fellow 
students, teachers, and the world.”17 
This Note examines how courts have struggled to apply the 
traditional student speech precedents to online speech.  Part I 
summarizes the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding student 
speech rights.  Part II discusses how courts have applied these 
cases when the speech at issue originates off-campus.  Part III 
argues that the analytical approach used in J.S. ex rel H.S. v. 
Bethlehem Area School District18 and Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District19 appropriately balances student free speech and 
the necessary disciplinary functions of school authorities.   
 
17  J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002). 
18  J.S., 807 A.2d 847. 
19  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007), appeal 
denied, 2007 WL 3120192 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007). 
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I. RESTRICTING STUDENT SPEECH: THE SEMINAL CASES 
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District20 
In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines, Iowa 
decided to protest the Vietnam War “by wearing black armbands 
during the holiday season and by fasting on December 16 and New 
Year’s Eve.” 21  The principals of the local schools learned of the 
plan and adopted a policy requiring any student wearing an 
armband to school to remove it or face suspension.22  Three 
students nevertheless wore the armbands to school and were 
suspended.23  They brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an 
injunction against the policy and for nominal damages.24  The 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected the 
students’ conduct, famously declaring that students do not “shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”25  
The speech at issue in Tinker was “a silent, passive expression 
of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.”26  
There was no evidence that the students’ protest interfered in any 
way with the rights of other students.27  The District Court, though, 
concluded that the school authorities behaved reasonably in 
suspending the students because they feared it would cause a 
disturbance.28  The Supreme Court responded that 
 
20  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see generally 
Aaron Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet 
Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 120–43 (2003) (carefully examining the facts at 
issue in Tinker, including a close reading of the District Court and Court of Appeals 
decisions). 
21  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id.  
25  Id. at 506. 
26  Id. at 508. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
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“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough 
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”29 
Any departure from absolute regimentation may 
cause trouble.  Any variation from the majority’s 
opinion may inspire fear.  Any word spoken, in 
class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that 
deviates from the views of another person may start 
an argument or cause a disturbance.  But our 
Constitution says we must take this risk.30 
The Court emphasized that “state-operated schools may not be 
enclaves of totalitarianism” and students must be permitted to 
express views that run counter to what is “officially approved.”31  
Students are free to express their opinions, however controversial, 
so long as they do so “without ‘materially and substantially 
interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of 
others.”32  Student conduct that “materially disrupts classwork or 
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” is 
not protected by the First Amendment and thus may be restricted 
by school authorities.33  
B. From Fraser to Morse 
The Court continued its effort to apply the First Amendment 
“in light of the special characteristics of the school environment”34 
in Bethel School District No. 402 v. Fraser35 and Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier,36 two cases in which the Court 
carved out exceptions to Tinker’s material disruption analysis.  
 
29  Id. 
30  Id. (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).  
31  Id. at 511. 
32  Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
33  Id.  
34  Id. at 506. 
35  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 402 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
36  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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More recently, in Morse v. Frederick,37 the Court held that 
students may be disciplined for advocating drug use.38 
Mathew Fraser, a student at Bethel High School, delivered a 
speech nominating a fellow student for a student government 
position at a school-sponsored assembly.  In the speech, he 
“referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor.”39  A school disciplinary rule provided 
that “conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the 
educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, 
profane language or gestures.”40  The school determined that 
Fraser’s speech violated this rule; accordingly, he was suspended 
for three days and his name removed from a list of candidates to 
speak at graduation.41   
The Court emphasized “that the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.”42  This is partially due to the 
school’s unique function, which is to “inculcate the habits and 
manners of civility.”43  It is appropriate, then, for a school to 
determine that the essential lessons of civility cannot be taught in 
an atmosphere where lewd, indecent, or offensive speech takes 
place.44  Considering the offensive nature of Fraser’s speech,45 the 
Court determined that the school was within its rights to punish 
it.46 
 
37  Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
38  Id. at 2623–29.  
39  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78. 
40  Id. at 678. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. at 682. 
43  Id. at 681 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). But cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) 
(criticizing “[t]he desire of the Legislature to foster a homogeneous people with 
American ideals”). 
44  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
45  Id. (“The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly offensive to both 
teachers and students—indeed to any mature person.”). 
46  Id. at 685. 
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The Court has since expressed ambivalence regarding Fraser’s 
analysis47 and a more thorough discussion of the case is beyond 
the scope of this Note.  In Morse, the Court gleaned two basic 
principles from Fraser: First, “that ‘the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings’ . . . [and] second, . . . that the 
mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.”48 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier addressed a school 
newspaper published as part of a journalism class.49  The school’s 
principal objected to two of the articles set to appear in the next 
issue.50  One described students’ experiences with pregnancy; the 
other discussed the impact of divorce on students at school.51  
Following its decision in Fraser, the Court noted that “[a] school 
need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic 
educational mission,’ even though the government could not 
censor similar speech outside school.”52  The Court distinguished 
Tinker by noting that Tinker addressed whether a school must 
tolerate particular student speech, whereas here the issue was 
whether a school must affirmatively promote particular student 
speech.53  Regarding this second form of student speech, the Court 
held that schools may “exercis[e] editorial control over the style 
and content . . . so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”54  
 
47  See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (“The mode of analysis 
employed in Fraser is not entirely clear.”). 
48  Id. at 2626–27. 
49  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). 
50  Id. at 263. 
51  Id.  
52  Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 402 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)). 
53  Id. at 270–71.  In evaluating whether the newspaper constituted school-sponsored 
speech, the Court noted that the newspaper was written and edited by students in a 
journalism class which was paid for by the Board of Education, and for which the 
students received academic credit. Id. at 262–63, 268. 
54  Id. at 273.  The Court suggested that a school may censor offensive student speech 
in a school-sponsored publication in the same way that it may censor “speech that is . . . 
ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or 
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. at 271–72.   
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More recently, in Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court 
brought Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier to bear on a case involving 
a student displaying a banner bearing the phrase: “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS.”55  Joseph Frederick unfurled the banner across the street 
from the school as students gathered to watch the Olympic torch 
relay pass through the city.56  When Frederick failed to take down 
the banner at Principal Morse’s request, he was suspended for ten 
days.57  Morse later explained her decision, saying she told 
Frederick to remove the banner because it “encouraged illegal drug 
use.”58  The Court reasoned that the banner may, in fact, 
“reasonably [be] regarded as promoting illegal drug use,” and thus 
held that the school did not violate Frederick’s First Amendment 
rights by confiscating it.59 
In dicta, the Court emphasized the unique role of public 
education and what that means for students’ rights.60  For example, 
the Court noted that, in the Fourth Amendment context, the nature 
of students’ rights “is what is appropriate for children in school.”61  
Accordingly, “some easing of the restrictions” regarding searches 
 
55  Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).  Although the Court noted that 
Kuhlmeier did not control, it considered the case “instructive” because it “acknowledged 
that schools may regulate some speech ‘even though the government could not censor 
similar speech outside the school.’” Id. at 2627 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266).  
Strictly speaking, the Court’s holding in Morse is best understood as a categorical 
exception to Tinker. 
56  Id. at 2622.  The Court rejected Frederick’s argument that this was not a school 
speech case, on grounds the event occurred during school hours and was sanctioned by 
Morse “as an approved social event.” Id. at 2624.  It acknowledged that “[t]here is some 
uncertainty . . . as to when courts should apply school-speech precedents,” but this case 
was clear. Id. 
57  Id. at 2622. 
58  Id. at 2622–23.  The school superintendent upheld the principal’s decision, 
explaining that the phrase “bong hits” typically refers to “a means of smoking 
marijuana.” Id. at 2623. 
59  Id. at 2622. 
60  Id. at 2627. 
61  Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995)). 
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is required.62  This difference of standard apparently stems from 
“the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”63 
The Morse Court had occasion to offer guidance on the issue of 
off-campus speech.64  Frederick argued that the school lacked 
authority to discipline him because his speech occurred off school 
property.65  The Court, however, did not address this issue in 
detail.  It stated, without much discussion, that the event was a 
school-sanctioned activity and thus, should be analyzed under the 
traditional student-speech cases.66 
II. RESTRICTING SPEECH ORIGINATING OFF-CAMPUS 
A. Off-Campus Speech Generally 
Recall the Supreme Court’s famous pronouncement that 
students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”67  What happens 
when the speech originates outside the schoolhouse gate but 
nonetheless causes the kind of disruption that, had it occurred on-
campus, could be regulated under Tinker?  The lack of a Supreme 
Court decision on this point makes this a difficult question, and 
courts struggle to determine the off-campus reach of school 
authority.  In this section this Note surveys a number of cases 
dealing with the regulation of off-campus speech.  This Note 
demonstrates that courts lack a consistent doctrinal analysis for 
 
62  Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)). 
63  Id. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656); see also id. at 2638 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (basing the unique public school free-speech standards “on some special 
characteristic of the school setting” which “in this case was the threat to the physical 
safety of students”). 
64  See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age 22 (B.C. Legal 
Stud. Res. Paper No. 149, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112789. 
65  Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624. 
66  Id.; Papandrea, supra note 64, at 23 (suggesting that the Court’s “tremendous 
deference” to the school’s interpretation here indicates an erosion of student speech 
rights).  
67  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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establishing the borders of school authority over off-campus 
speech, which is only made worse in the online-speech context.   
A word on methodology is in order.  This Note’s author’s 
interest in the cases discussed in this and the following sections 
lies in how they address (or avoid) the jurisdictional question of 
what constitutes on-campus speech.  Thus, in discussing these 
cases, this Note focuses (sometimes exclusively) on their treatment 
of the jurisdictional question rather than on their holdings.  If a 
court concludes that the speech is on-campus, how it then applies 
Tinker or Fraser certainly influences the debate.  This point is 
addressed further in Part III.  Nonetheless, the more important 
issue for the purposes of this Note is how to determine the 
boundaries of the schoolhouse gate.   
In Klein v. Smith,68 the court addressed the issue of whether a 
student may be disciplined for making a vulgar gesture to a teacher 
outside of school and after school hours.69  The student was 
suspended for ten days after the incident under a rule providing 
disciplinary measures for “vulgar or extremely inappropriate 
language or conduct directed to a staff member.”70  The court 
reasoned that Klein’s speech was sufficiently off-campus for 
purposes of Tinker and that his suspension violated his First 
Amendment rights.71  
The conduct in question occurred in a restaurant 
parking lot, far removed from any school premises 
or facilities, at a time when the teacher, Clark, was 
not associated in any way with his duties as a 
teacher.  The student was not engaged in any school 
activity or associated in any way with school 
premises or his role as a student.  Any possible 
 
68  Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440  (D. Me. 1986). 
69  Id. at 1440.  Defendant argued that “Plaintiff’s gesture had no . . . expressive content 
and is, therefore, not ‘speech’ entitled to First Amendment protection.” Id. at 1441 n.2.  
The court rejected this argument. Id. 
70  Id. at 1441. 
71  Id. at 1442. 
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connection between his act of “giving the finger” to 
a person who happens to be one of his teachers and 
the proper and orderly operation of the school’s 
activities is . . . far too attenuated to support 
discipline against Klein for violating the rule 
prohibiting vulgar or discourteous conduct toward a 
teacher.72 
The court does not present any sweeping standards or rules for 
determining what level of involvement with school activity was 
necessary to render Klein’s gesture punishable.  The factors 
considered in the above-quoted passage merely suggest that this 
was not a close call.  Importantly though, the court’s jurisdictional 
analysis suggests that the mere fact that Klein’s gesture occurred 
outside the physical property of the school did not automatically 
protect him from school discipline.73 
In Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Center School 
District,74 the Second Circuit stated that although educators “must 
be accorded substantial discretion” to execute their responsibilities, 
their “authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate.”75  
The speech at issue was a satirical newspaper, entitled Hard Times, 
that was published and distributed off school grounds, but 
addressed to the school community.76  It featured articles 
“pasquinading school lunches, cheerleaders, classmates, and 
teachers.”77  Articles on masturbation and prostitution were also 
included.78  When Hard Times surfaced in the school, a teacher 
confiscated it and presented it to the principal, who, in consultation 
 
72  Id. at 1441 (emphasis added).  The court also noted that the gesture did not 
constitute “fighting words.” Id. at 1442. 
73  The court emphasized that the restaurant parking lot was far from school and that the 
activity was not associated with school premises. Id.  The court had the opportunity to 
draw a bright-line rule, stating that since the conduct occurred outside of school property, 
the school had no right to discipline Klein; it refrained from doing so. 
74  Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
75  Id. at 1044–45. 
76  Id. at 1045. 
77  Id.  
78  Id. 
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with the superintendent and the Board of Education, imposed a 
number of penalties on the students involved.79  
In analyzing whether the publication constituted on-campus 
speech, the court observed that it was neither printed in school nor 
sold in school.80  Although “a few articles were transcribed on 
school typewriters, and . . . the finished product was secretly and 
unobtrusively stored in a teacher’s closet,” the court emphasized 
that it “was conceived, executed, and distributed outside the 
school.”81  Any on-campus activity was therefore de minimis.82  
The court stressed that “because school officials have ventured out 
of the school yard and into the general community where the 
freedom accorded expression is at its zenith,”83 their “power must 
be cabined within the rigorous confines of the First 
endment.”84  
In Bystrom v. Fridley High School,85 the Eighth Circuit opined 
on the status of an “underground newspaper.”86  Here, students 
distributed a publication on school grounds that school officials 
deemed violative of a number of policies.87  Specifically, school 
policy prohibited “pervasively indecent or vulgar” writings and 
writings “that invade the privacy of another.”88  The court 
ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the school policies, 
holding that the school was within its rights to discipline the 
offending students.89  In dicta, however, the cou
 
79  Id. at 1045–46.  The penalties included: (1) a five-day suspension; (2) segregation 
from others during study hall; (3) loss of student privileges; and (4) inclusion of 
suspension letters in the students’ files. Id. at 1046. 
80  Id. at 1050.  
81  Id. 
82  Id.  
83  Id.  
84  Id. at 1045. 
85 Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987). 
86 Id. at 749. 
87  Id.  
88  Id. at 750. 
89  Id. at 755. 
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Only distribution “on school property” is at issue 
here.  The school district asserts no authority to 
govern or punish what students say, write, or 
publish to each other or to the public at any location 
outside the school buildings and grounds.  If school 
authorities were to claim such a power, quite 
different issues would be raised, and the burden of 
the authorities to justify their policy under the First 
Amendment would be much greater, perhaps even 
insurmountable.90 
In Boucher v. School Board of Greenfield,91 the Seventh 
Circuit declined to follow Thomas and the Bystrom dicta.92  The 
“underground newspaper” at issue was entitled The Last.93  Its 
inaugural issue “provocatively explained that [it] was intended to 
‘ruffle a few feathers.’”94  The issue distributed on June 4, 1997 
included an article entitled, So You Want to Be A Hacker, which 
provided detailed instructions on how to break into the school 
computer network.95  Although written pseudonymously, it was 
soon determined that the author was Justin Boucher, a student at 
Greenfield High School.96  Boucher was suspended and the School 
Board subsequently voted to expel him.97   
Boucher argued, inter alia, that “school officials’ authority over 
off-campus expression is much more limited than it is over 
expression on school grounds[,]” citing Bystrom and Thomas.98  
The court dismissed the reference to Bystrom as “merely 
dictum.”99  Regarding Thomas, the court suggested that the Second 
Circuit’s holding was based on the fact that the speech at issue 
 
90  Id. at 750.  
91  Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998). 
92  Id. at 828. 
93  Id. at 822. 
94  Id.  
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 823. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 828.  
99  Id. at 829. 
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“lacked the potential to disrupt school activities.”100  The Thomas 
Court declined to consider a hypothetical case “in which a group of 
students incites substantial disruption within the school from some 
remote locale” because, on the facts before it, “there was simply no 
threat or forecast of material and substantial disruption within the 
school.”101  The Seventh Circuit similarly limited its holding to the 
specific facts of the case.102   
B.  Internet Speech and the Search for a New Standard  
This section discusses a number of recent cases and scholarly 
articles that struggle with the First Amendment rights of middle- 
and high school students on the Internet.  As mentioned in the 
Introduction, the pervasive quality of the Internet makes this issue 
much more difficult than the underground newspaper cases 
surveyed above.  In those cases, courts could at least take for 
granted that on-campus speech was speech either originating on or 
brought onto school property.  In the online context, speech 
originating in the privacy of one’s home is automatically brought 
into the school by the mere fact that modern classrooms and school 
libraries provide Internet access.  One option for courts is to simply 
apply the school-speech standards across the board for all student 
online speech on the rationale that any blog, Facebook profile, or 
MySpace page are, by their nature, accessible on campus.  Courts 
are rightly resistant to such a sweeping limitation of student speech 
rights.103  On the other hand, online speech can have the same 
disruptive effect inside the school walls as the on-campus speech 
 
100  Id. at 828.   
101  Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 
1979).  As we see in the following sections, this is precisely the scenario that the online 
speech cases present. 
102  Boucher, 124 F.3d at 829 (noting that since the article was in fact brought on 
campus, the court need not consider the hypothetical situation envisioned in Thomas).  
The court added that the article advocated on-campus activity. Id. 
103  See Layshock v. Hermitage, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007), appeal 
denied, 2007 WL 3120192 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007) (“The mere fact that the [I]nternet 
may be accessed at school does not authorize school officials to become censors of the 
world-wide web.”). 
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that is typically unprotected.  It is reasonable, then, to afford 
schools at least some discretion to discipline students for truly 
disruptive speech, even if that speech originates online, from a 
home computer.  The difficult issue is, of course, where to draw 
the line. 
The off-campus speech cases104 discussed above provide little 
more than confusion and ambivalence.  The Klein court merely 
presented a list of factors, concluding that the relationship between 
the speech at issue and school activity was “far too attenuated to 
support discipline.”105  The court’s failure to draw a bright line or 
explain what degree of association with the school would have 
permitted its disciplinary measures renders it of little help to future 
courts.  The court in Thomas is more helpful in this regard in that it 
plainly states that school officials’ “authority does not reach 
beyond the schoolhouse gate.”106  This seems to imply that when 
the activity takes place largely off-campus, it is subject to full First 
Amendment protection.  Yet, the court subtly resisted this 
inference by declining to consider whether a school may discipline 
students for “incit[ing] substantial disruption . . . from some 
remote locale,”107 i.e. the Internet.   
The Bystrom court’s statement in dicta is more helpful but still 
not conclusive.  It suggested that if the school asserted “authority 
to govern or punish what students say, write, or publish . . . outside 
the school building and grounds,” it would raise “quite different 
issues.”108 In the cases discussed below, courts wrestle these very 
issues.109 
 
104  “Off-campus” is used here loosely, recognizing that the extent to which the speech 
occurred off- or on-campus was the very issue in these cases. 
105  Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441 (D. Me. 1986); see supra note 72 and 
accompanying text. 
106  Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1044–45; see supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
107  Id. at 1052 n.17; see supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
108  Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987); see supra note 86 
and accompanying text. 
109  The case law on this issue is presented chronologically, rather than attempting to 
group the cases as more restrictive or less restrictive.  
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When Brandon Beussink was a student at Woodland High 
School, he created a website from his home computer that was 
“highly critical” of the school administration.110  The site used 
“vulgar language” and contained a hyperlink to the school’s 
official website.111  Another student showed the website to a 
teacher, who then informed the principal.112  The principal 
suspended Beussink for five days and later increased it to ten 
days.113  He testified that “he made the decision to discipline 
Beussink immediately upon viewing the homepage . . . before he 
knew whether any other students had seen or even had knowledge 
of [it].”114  Although the court stressed the off-campus nature of 
Beussink’s website,115 it applied Tinker’s material and substantial 
interference test, stating that “Beussink’s homepage did not 
materially and substantially interfere with school discipline.”116  
The court did not address whether the website could be considered 
off-campus speech and, thus subject to full First Amendment 
protection.117 
In Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415,118 Nick Emmett, a 
student at Kentlake High School posted a website entitled the 
“Unofficial Kentlake High Home Page.”119  The website contained 
“mock obituaries” of fellow students and had a feature allowing 
 
110  Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  
The court emphasized that Beussink did not use school facilities or resources to create the 
site.  It was created with his home computer, not during school hours. Id. 
111  Id. at 1177 n.1.  There was no hyperlink from the school’s page back to Beussink’s 
page. Id.  
112  Id. at 1177–78.  The court noted Beussink did not give out the internet address of his 
homepage to the fellow student who displayed it for the teacher. Id. at 1178. 
113  Id. at 1179. 
114  Id. at 1178. 
115  Id. at 1177. 
116  Id. at 1182. 
117  Most likely, since the website did not cause the kind of interference that would 
subject it to discipline under Tinker, the court declined to charter new territory regarding 
the boundaries of in-school speech. 
118  Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).   
119  Id. at 1089.  The court observed that the site was created at home without the use of 
school resources. Id. 
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visitors to vote on who would “die” next.120  The website was 
featured on an evening television news story, which characterized 
the site as promoting a “hit list.”121  The next day, the school 
principal placed Emmett on “emergency expulsion for 
intimidation, harassment, [and] disruption to the educational 
process.”122  The court distinguished the case from both Fraser 
and Kuhlmeier, emphasizing that Emmett’s website was far 
removed from any school 
Plaintiff’s speech was not at a school assembly, as 
in Fraser, and was not in a school-sponsored 
newspaper, as in Kuhlmeier.  It was not produced in 
connection with any class or school project.  
Although the intended audience was undoubtedly 
connected to Kentlake High School, the speech was 
entirely outside of the school’s supervision or 
control.123  
The court, accordingly, held for Emmett, enjoining the school from 
enforcing its suspension.124 
David Hudson argues that Emmett properly dismissed the 
school’s arguments for discipline on grounds that the school lacked 
supervision or control over the speech.125  “Speech on a website 
should be no different than if a student had a conversation with 
other students off-campus about a school administrator.”126   
 
120  Id. 
121  Id.  The phrase “hit list” appeared nowhere on the website. Id. 
122  Id.  The emergency expulsion was subsequently reduced to five days. Id. 
123  Id. at 1090.  Interestingly, the court could have analyzed this case under Kuhlmeier 
because the website’s title, “Unofficial Kentlake High Home Page,” could “reasonably 
[be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
124  Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090. 
125  David Hudson, Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing 
Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 221 
(2000). 
126  Id. 
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Aaron Caplan represented Emmett as a staff attorney for the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington.127  He argued that 
schools lack jurisdiction to enforce off-campus behavior for the 
same reason that “[j]udges would never find speakers in summary 
contempt of court for disrespectful statements made outside the 
courtroom.”128  He further notes that “Internet technology is not 
unique in its ability to penetrate school walls”129 and offers the 
following hypothetical situation: 
Imagine a student who writes a letter to the editor of 
the local newspaper, criticizing the principal in 
language sufficiently vulgar to justify punishment 
under [Bethel v. Fraser] if the letter had been read 
aloud at a school assembly.  The school could not 
punish the student for expressing her views in the 
free press.  This would be true even if the school 
library subscribes to the paper, the student knows 
about the subscription, and she tells friends where 
to find it in the school library’s copy.130 
Caplan concludes that “[t]he mere ability to access texts, sounds, 
or images from within a school does not transform them into on-
campus speech.”131  
Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea identifies five justifications 
used to permit schools to restrict student-speech rights and argues 
that none of them logically extend to restricting student digital 
media.132  The rationale used most frequently by courts is what 
Papandrea calls “the so-called ‘special characteristics’ of the 
elementary and secondary school environment.”133  Courts should 
defer to school administrators because “[t]he educational process 
 
127  Caplan, supra note 20, at 93 n.*. 
128  Id. at 143. 
129  Id. at 158. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. at 159. 
132  Papandrea, supra note 64, at 38. 
133  Id. at 45 (“[T]he Court has . . . tended to rest its student-speech decisions on the so-
called ‘special characteristics’ of the elementary and secondary school environment.”). 
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requires quiet and order, and school officials . . . generally have to 
make quick decisions about what to tolerate and what to 
condemn.”134  She argues that this justification has “little traction 
outside of the classroom setting.”135  She further notes that 
“[g]iving broad deference to school officials to punish student 
speech in the digital media would be tantamount to granting them 
authority to censor the speech of adolescents generally.”136  
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District,137 the court 
dealt not with a student website, but rather with a controversial e-
mail that circulated around the school.138  Plaintiff Zachariah Paul 
compiled an offensive “Top Ten” list about the school athletic 
director, Robert Bozzuto.139  Paul composed the list “while at 
home after school hours” and e-mailed it to his friends “from his 
home computer.”140  Weeks later, copies of the “Bozzuto Top Ten 
list” were found in the teachers’ lounge.141  The school suspended 
Paul for ten days on grounds that “the list contained offensive 
remarks about a school official, was found on school grounds, and 
that Paul admitted creating the list.”142 
Plaintiffs argued “that a heightened standard applies because 
the speech at issue occurred off school grounds.”143  The court 
responded that it “need not resolve [t]his issue [because] [t]he 
overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed school speech 
(whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker.”144  This 
statement is as striking as it is inaccurate.  As demonstrated above, 
 
134  Id. 
135  Id. at 46. 
136  Id.  
137  Killion v. Franklin Regional Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
138  Id. at 448. 
139  Id.  The list contained derogatory references to Bozzuto’s appearance and the size of 
his genitals. Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 448–49.  The court noted that the e-mail was not distributed by Paul, but rather 
by another “undisclosed” student. Id. at 449.  
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 455. 
144  Id. (emphasis added). 
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the Klein and Thomas courts both declined to apply Tinker because 
the speech at issue was off-campus.145  The dicta in Bystrom 
stressed that the school’s discipline was constitutional only 
because the newspaper was distributed on campus.146  In Emmett, 
the court similarly refused to apply Tinker or Kuhlmeier because 
the website at issue was sufficiently distinct from school 
activity.147  Beussink is the only case that applied Tinker even 
while stressing the off-campus nature of the speech at issue.  Yet, 
its authority is not overwhelming by any measure.  Perhaps the 
court’s sweeping statement may be better understood in light of its 
holding that Paul’s suspension was indeed unconstitutional 
because the school did not satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption 
test.148  The court added that the fact that the list was brought on 
campus, even though it was not brought by Paul, was further 
reason to apply Tinker.149  
Of all the online student speech cases, J.S. ex rel H.S. v. 
Bethlehem Area School District provides the most extensive and 
detailed analysis of legal issues involved in disciplining students 
for speech originating off-campus.150  Justin Swidler, referred to 
by the court as J.S.,151 was an eighth grade student at Nitschmann 
Middle School.152  He created a website entitled “Teacher Sux.”153  
The site was made on his home computer and on his own time, not 
part of a school project or sponsored by the School District.154  On 
the site, J.S. “made derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening 
comments, primarily about the student’s algebra teacher, Mrs. 
 
145  See supra text accompanying notes 69–84. 
146  See supra text accompanying notes 86–90. 
147  See supra text accompanying notes 119–24. 
148  Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455.  Had the court wished to rule against the plaintiffs, 
one would expect a more nuanced discussion of the relevant case law.  
149  Id. 
150  Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the 
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 246–50. 
151  See id. at 247 (referring to J.S. by his full name). 
152  J.S., 807 A.2d at 850.  
153  Id. at 851. 
154  Id. at 850. 
VOL19_BOOK2_FRYMAN 2/18/2009  3:07:35 AM 
578 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:557 
 
  
                                                                                                                      
Kathleen Fulmer and Nitschmann Middle School principal, Mr. A. 
Thomas Kartsotis.”155  The legally-minded middle schooler placed 
a disclaimer at the outset.156  By entering the site, the visitor 
agreed that he or she was not a school staff member and that he or 
she would not tell any employees of the school about the site.157
The court discussed in great detail the many derogatory and 
profanity-laced references to teachers.158  “The most striking web 
page,” the court observed, regarded J.S.’s algebra teacher, Mrs. 
Fulmer.159  The page’s caption read, “Why Should She Die?” and 
directed the reader to “Take a look at the diagram and the reasons I 
gave, then give me $20 to help pay for the hitman.”160  Students, 
faculty, and administrators eventually viewed the site and reported 
it to Principal Kartsotis.161  The principal believed the threats to be 
serious and proceeded to contact police authorities and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.162  Mrs. Fulmer testified that, as a result 
of viewing the website, she “suffered stress, anxiety, loss of 
appetite, loss of sleep, loss of weight, and a general sense of loss of 
well being.”163  Additionally, the website “had a demoralizing 
impact on the school community.”164  At the end of the school 
year, the School District sent a letter to J.S. and his parents, 
informing them that J.S. would be suspended.165  The letter cited 
 
155  Id. at 851. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. at 851.  Despite J.S.’s intentions, the disclaimer did not prevent access to the site, 
which was not password protected. Id. 
158  Id.  
159  Id. 
160  Id. 
161  Id. at 851–52.  The court noted that J.S. had told other students about it. Id. at 852. 
162  Id. at 852.  The police confirmed the identity of J.S. but declined to file criminal 
charges. Id. 
163  Id.  Mrs. Fulmer was prescribed anti-anxiety and anti-depression medication and 
was unable to finish the school year. Id. 
164  Id.  Principal Kartsotis testified that the website’s effect “was comparable to the 
death of a student or staff member.” Id. 
165  Id.  The suspension was originally three days and then extended to ten days.  Shortly 
thereafter, the school began expulsion proceedings. Id.  By the time expulsions hearings 
were conducted, J.S.’s parents had enrolled him in another school. Id. at 853. 
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“threat to a teacher, harassment of a teacher and principal, and 
disrespect to a teacher and p 166
The court first considered the School District’s argument that 
J.S.’s statements constituted a “true threat,” and thus would be 
unprotected even outside a school setting.167  The court rejected 
this argument, finding that “the web site . . . was a sophomoric, 
crude, highly offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or 
parody.  However, it did not reflect a serious expression of intent 
to inflict harm.”168  
Turning to a discussion of the seminal school free speech 
cases, the court noted that the school setting is sui generis.169  Its 
“awesome charge” is to balance the constitutional rights of the 
student with the preservation of order and a proper educational 
environment.170  The court recognized that applying the traditional 
doctrine to the Internet is far more complicated.  “First, a threshold 
issue regarding the ‘location’ of the speech must be resolved to 
determine if the unique concerns regarding the school environment 
are even implicated, i.e., is it on campus speech or purely off-
campus speech?”171  It is this “threshold issue” that is at the core of 
all the cases discussed in this section.172  
The court found that there was “a sufficient nexus between the 
web site and the school campus to consider the speech as occurring 
on-campus.”173  One can discern three distinct facts that the court 
considered in its discussion: (1) J.S. “facilitated the on-campus 
nature of the speech” by accessing the website at school and 
showing it to fellow students;174 (2) the website targeted a school 
 
166  Id. at 852. 
167  Id. at 856. 
168  Id. at 859. 
169  Id. at 855. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. at 864 (“Tinker’s simple armband . . . has been replaced by J.S.’s complex 
multimedia web site, accessible to fellow students, teachers, and the world.”). 
172  Id. 
173  Id. at 865. 
174  Id.  
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audience;175 and (3) since the algebra teacher and principal were 
featured prominently on the site, “it was inevitable that the 
contents of the web site would pass from students to teachers, 
inspiring circulation of the web page on school property.”176  The 
court summarized its holding as follows: “[W]here speech that is 
aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the 
school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech 
will be considered on-campus speech.”177  Having established that 
J.S.’s speech occurred on-campus for First Amendment purposes, 
the court then applied the traditional free-speech cases.178  It 
concluded that “the web site created disorder and significantly and 
adversely impacted the delivery of instruction.”179  The school 
successfully demonstrated that the site “created an actual and 
substantial interference with the work of the school” to satisfy the 
Supreme Court standard under Tinker.180 
Professor Clay Calvert argues that the J.S. court’s application 
of Tinker is too broad.181  Suppose a student’s mother creates a 
website similar to the one created by J.S.: 
The site does not make any true threats of violence, 
but rather calls the teachers, among other things, 
“morons” who “clearly have no clue about 
teaching.”  The site includes photographs of certain 
teachers morphing into Adolph Hitler.  The page, in 
other words, is very similar to some of the Web 
sites created today by minors off campus that attack 
school personnel. 
 
175  Id. Compare id. with Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (“Although the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to 
Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely outside of the school’s supervision or 
control.”). 
176  J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. at 865–69. 
179  Id. at 869. 
180  Id. 
181  Calvert, supra note 150, at 280–82. 
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. . . . 
Would the school be able to punish the mother for 
her speech? The answer, of course, is no.182  
Calvert argues that just because the student spends a large part of 
his day on school grounds while his mother does not, should not 
afford schools additional jurisdiction.183   
The J.S. decision should be considered side-by-side with 
Layshock, a case that applied a similar analysis but arrived at a 
different conclusion.184  Plaintiff Justin Layshock created a parody 
profile of his high school principal, Eric Trosch,185 using the 
website MySpace.186  As the court explained, “MySpace has a 
template for user profiles, which allows website users to fill in 
background information and include answers to specific 
questions.”187  Layshock answered the questions, impersonating 
Principal Trosch.188  The profile contained “nonsensical answers to 
silly questions” and “crude juvenile language.”189  When the 
profile was discovered, the school administrators unsuccessfully 
sought to block access to the site.190  They also directed teachers to 
not permit students to use computers in the classroom.191  After an 
informal hearing, Layshock was suspended for ten days. 
 
182  Id. at 281. 
183  Id. 
184  See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007), appeal 
denied, 2007 WL 3120192 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007). 
185  Id. at 591. 
186  MySpace, http://myspace.com.  The court described it as “a very popular Internet 
site where users can share photos, journals, personal interests, and the like with other 
users of the Internet.” Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
187  Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
188  Id. 
189  Id.  At some later point, three other unflattering profiles of the principal appeared on 
MySpace, and the school admitted that it could not directly attribute which profile caused 
the cited disruption. Id. at 591, 593.  Layshock, though, did admit to creating one 
MySpace profile. Id. at 591.    
190  Id. at 592. 
191  School officials then contacted MySpace directly and the profiles were disabled. Id.  
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The court observed that the profile was created outside of 
school and not during school hours.192  Layshock, however, 
“engaged in some limited conduct related to the profile while in 
school,” such as accessing the profile and showing it to 
classmates.193  There was also evidence that it was viewed by other 
students in school, which caused disruption.194  The school’s 
technology coordinator testified that he “spent approximately 25% 
of his time that week on issues related to the profiles.”195 
Following J.S., the court first addressed the difficult “threshold 
issue” of whether Layshock’s speech occurred on campus.196  “The 
mere fact that the [I]nternet may be accessed at school,” the court 
reasoned, “does not authorize school officials to become censors of 
the world-wide web.”197  The court quoted approvingly from 
Thomas, noting that when “school officials venture[] out of the 
school yard and into the general community  
. . . their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind 
government officials in the public arena.”198  The court noted, 
however, that Thomas did not address the scenario of students 
causing “substantial disruption” within the school by actions 
originating outside the school.199  And this was the scenario at 
issue here.   
The court then turned to the lengthy discussion of J.S., which it 
acknowledged as “an analogous case.”200  Although it considered 
the case on point, it “respectfully reach[ed] a slightly different 
 
192  Id. at 591.  Although the court stated that “[n]o school resources were used to create 
the profile,” Layshock did use a photograph of Trosch that he copied from the school’s 
website. Id. 
193  Id. at 591. 
194  Id. at 592.  A teacher testified that he “observed students congregating and giggling 
in his computer lab class,” while looking at Layshock’s profile. Id.  
195  Id. at 593. 
196  Id. at 597. 
197  Id.  The court stressed that schools must share their supervisory responsibilities with 
“families, churches, community organizations and the judicial system.” Id.   
198  Id. at 598. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. at 601–02. 
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balance between student expression and school authority.”201  The 
school failed to “establish[] a sufficient nexus between Justin 
[Layshock]’s speech  and a substantial disruption of the school 
environment.”202  The relationship between the off-campus 
conduct and any disruption in school was too attenuated for 
application of the Tinker test.203 
It is important to recognize one analytical difference between 
J.S. and Layshock.  J.S.’s “sufficient nexus” was between the off-
campus activity and the school.204  In Layshock, it was between the 
off-campus activity and the disruption.205  This difference will be 
addressed in a later section. 
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School 
District206 involved another eighth grader, Aaron Wisniewski, who 
created an offensive America Online (“AOL”) Instant Messenger 
(“IM”) “buddy icon.”207  The icon featured “a small drawing of a 
pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head.”208  Beneath it appeared 
the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the student’s English 
teacher.209  “Aaron sent IM messages displaying the icon to some 
15 members of his IM ‘buddy list.’”210  The icon could be viewed 
by members of Wisniewski’s buddy list, some of whom were 
students at the school, for three weeks.211  During that time, 
another student informed VanderMolen of the offending icon, who 
 
201  Id. at 602. 
202  Id. at 600.  Note the similar phraseology used in J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area 
School District, 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002). See supra note 174 and accompanying 
text.   
203  Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
204  J.S., 807 A.2d at 851. 
205  Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
206  Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).   
207  Id. at 35–36.  The court explained that a user’s buddy icon, or “IM icon,” is on 
display whenever the user sends or receives an instant message. Id. 
208  Id. at 36. 
209  Id.  
210  Id.  
211  Id.  
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in turn forwarded it to the principal.212  Aaron was suspended for 
five days 213
The Second Circuit conceded that “some courts have assessed 
a student’s statements concerning the killing of a school official  
. . . against the true ‘threat’ standard of Watts.”214  In this case, 
however, the court wished to go further.  “School officials,” it 
stated, “have significantly broader authority to sanction student 
speech than the Watts standard allows.”215  The Tinker standard 
applied here.216  As to the issue of Aaron’s off-campus conduct, 
the court said the following: “The fact that Aaron’s creation and 
transmission of the IM icon occurred away from school property 
does not necessarily insulate him from school discipline.”217  
Citing the hypothetical scenario envisioned by the same court in 
Thomas,218 the court recognized that “off-campus conduct can 
create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a 
school.”219  It found that indeed “it was reasonably foreseeable that 
the IM icon would come to the attention of school authorities and 
the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot.”220  
 
212  Id.  
213  Id.  The principal informed local police but an investigator concluded “that the icon 
was meant as a joke” and that “Aaron posed no real threat to VanderMolen.” Id.  Pending 
criminal charges were dropped. Id. 
214  Id. at 38; see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that speech 
constituting a “true ‘threat’” is unprotected by the First Amendment). 
215  Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38. 
216  Id.; see also supra Part I.A.  
217  Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. 
218  Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 
1979) (“We can, of course, envision a case in which a group of students incite substantial 
disruption within the school from some remote locale.”). 
219  Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. 
220  Id.  The panel was divided as to whether the test is reasonable foreseeability or 
whether it is sufficient that, on the undisputed facts here, the icon reached school 
grounds. Id.  For an application of Wisniewski, see Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
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III. DISCUSSION  
A. The Case for a “Sufficient Nexus” Standard 
This section argues that that the J.S. and Layshock Courts offer 
the appropriate balance between free speech protection and “the 
special characteristics of the school environment.”221  The court in 
Emmett, declining to apply Tinker because the speech occurred 
without school supervision, fails to provide schools with adequate 
tools for disciplining truly materially and disruptive behavior.  The 
Wisniewski Court’s reasonable foreseeability test went too far in 
the other direction and would effectively subject all student online 
speech to the Tinker test.  Any website, blog, Facebook or 
MySpace page, and even an e-mail can foreseeably be accessed on 
school grounds.   
The United States Supreme Court may have avoided weighing 
in on the standard for what constitutes on-campus speech for First 
Amendment purposes.  It has, however, been generous in 
explaining why student speech may be regulated more strictly than 
speech generally.  In this area, the Court’s dicta in its seminal 
student-speech cases may shed light on this difficult and thorny 
issue.  In Tinker, the Court stated that student conduct that 
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder” is 
not protected.222  The First Amendment, the Court explained, must 
be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.”223  In Fraser, the Court elaborated further: schools 
may impart fundamental values that are “essential to a democratic 
society.”224  Student conduct that undermines a school’s ability to 
conduct its legitimate function is problematic and may therefore be 
regulated under certain circumstances.225  It is true that these 
 
221  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
222  Id. at 513. 
223  Id. at 506. 
224  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
225  See id. 
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statements are dicta but they reflect the values underlying the 
Court’s various modes of analysis.  
Let us step back momentarily and ask why student speech 
should be subject to censorship at all; the Court answers in a clear 
voice.  Schools have a state-recognized task, and conduct that 
fundamentally undermines that task is subject to a stricter level of 
scrutiny than the First Amendment generally permits.  Some courts 
and commentators assume that the student speech restrictions stem 
from the special characteristics of the physical school grounds.226  
Based on the Supreme Court’s characterization of public education 
in developing its doctrine, however, it appears that the special 
standard used to analyze student speech stems from the school’s 
unique educational role.  The question before courts in student 
online speech cases, then, is not whether to extend school authority 
to censor student speech beyond the school grounds, but whether it 
makes sense to limit that authority to the physical school grounds 
in the first place.  
The facts of J.S. suggest the strongest argument for its 
approach.  There, a middle-school student’s off-campus activity 
indeed caused substantial and material disruption on campus.  Had 
J.S.’s medium been the kind of underground newspaper at issue in 
Thomas and Bystrom, Tinker would apply when the newspaper was 
brought on campus.  But here, J.S.’s speech was brought on 
campus by the very nature of its medium.  The Internet made it 
immediately accessible from school computers and personal 
computers using school-supplied Internet access.  The court, in 
struggling with this fact, articulated a standard that would allow 
the school to restrict speech like J.S.’s while still protecting speech 
that truly has nothing to do with school. 
Calvert’s argument that the J.S. Court’s analysis would, if 
carried to its logical conclusion, punish the parent of a student who 
creates a similar website is flawed.  It fails to appreciate that, even 
if a student is punished for off-campus behavior, the disciplinary 
 
226  See supra Part III.B. 
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measures available to the school are limited to school property.  
The school cannot punish a student qua citizen for any speech 
under Tinker!  It may only punish him qua student, i.e. by 
suspension, denial of school privileges, etc.  If a student can be 
punished only in his capacity as a student, then it is perfectly 
reasonable that the school cannot extend punishment to his mother, 
even for the identical speech. 
The Emmett court’s approach, advocated by Hudson and 
Caplan, fails to adequately address the dilemma faced by 
Nitschmann Middle School.  The damage caused by J.S.’s website 
demonstrates that Internet speech is different than an off-campus 
conversation among classmates in a fundamental way.  An off-
campus conversation is not instantaneously broadcast inside the 
school walls.  A more apt metaphor for Internet speech is an off-
campus conversation in which all students, teachers, and 
administrators, are invited to listen simply by visiting a website.  
Internet speech is not private speech the way that a conversation 
between schoolmates is and, thus, should not be treated similarly 
under the law.   
Suppose a student makes a statement off-campus, in a 
conversation with a friend, that would be subject to discipline had 
it been uttered in the school cafeteria.  The school rightly may not 
take action even if the controversial statement is discussed and 
repeated by others in school.  If the student, though, repeated his 
statement in school and it caused material and substantial 
disruption, he or she would be subject to discipline.  Online speech 
is analogous, not to a conversation between friends off-campus, 
but rather to a student repeating his statement in school.  The 
website itself, which may be viewed by others on school property, 
is the original speech.  When others access it at the school library, 
it is as though the student is speaking repeatedly.  Indeed, this is 
one of the major attractions of expressing oneself online.  It allows 
one’s words and images to be viewed in their original format by a 
wide audience. 
In this light, Professor Papandrea’s notion of what constitutes 
the classroom setting is overly narrow.  It fails to appreciate that 
speech originating off-campus, such as Internet speech, can disrupt 
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the order and discipline required of the classroom setting.  She 
correctly points out that “digital speech is generally nowhere and 
everywhere at the same time.”227  To a large extent, then, limiting 
school authority to speech uttered within schools, as Papandrea 
urges,228 is somewhat arbitrary.  In today’s wired culture, digital 
speech is equally capable of causing disruption. 
The argument that the deference afforded to schools by J.S. and 
Layshock is “tantamount to granting them authority to censor the 
speech of adolescents generally”229 is aimed at the wrong target.  
Obviously, expanding the boundaries of the school effectively 
allows for greater censorship.  However, the school boundaries 
should not be determined by how much censorship is too much, but 
rather by what justifies that censorship.  Online speech is 
sufficiently similar to speech taking place physically on-campus to 
warrant an analogous treatment under the law.  If the fear is that 
juvenile speech is not sufficiently protected, the response should be 
to alter how Tinker and Fraser are applied.  It is Tinker, Fraser, 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse that restrict student speech, not J.S. and 
Layshock.  In the Internet Age, it seems increasingly arbitrary to 
grant schools authority to regulate certain speech but only if it 
physically occurs on campus. 
Caplan’s analogy to a judge finding somebody in contempt of 
court for offensive statements made outside the courtroom is 
imprecise.230  Judges and schools regulate certain speech for 
fundamentally different reasons.  In a courtroom it is indeed the 
physical location of the offending speech that warrants contempt.  
The same speech outside of court, no matter how offensive and 
inappropriate, could not have the same effect as the speech uttered 
ten feet before the judge.  Regarding student Internet speech, this is 
simply not the case.  Once again, consider the facts of J.S.  
 
227  Papandrea, supra note 64. 
228 Id. at 47 (“[C]ourts should continue to declare that speech that lacks any sort of 
physical connection to the school should fall outside of its jurisdiction.”) (emphasis 
added). 
229  Id. at 46. 
230  Caplan, supra note 20, at 143; supra text accompanying note 128. 
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Caplan’s and Papandrea’s insistence on limiting Tinker to speech 
physically uttered on school grounds would render schools 
impotent to deal with students like J.S.  It is not difficult to 
imagine how students like J.S. could cause substantial and material 
disruption in school without uttering a word on school property.  
Suppose a tenth-grade student creates a website supporting his 
candidacy for school-wide office.  On the site, he trashes his 
opponents with racist, anti-gay, anti-Semitic rhetoric.  So long as 
he falls short of Watts’s “true threat” standard, according to 
Caplan, Papandrea, and Emmett, the school can do nothing to 
discipline him even if his vile remarks cause heated outbursts 
during class or worse, minority students to stay home out of fear. 
B. A Suggested Analysis 
The J.S. court considered three factors in determining whether 
the speech at issue was on-campus for purposes of applying 
Tinker: (1) whether J.S. accessed the site at school; (2) whether the 
site targeted a school audience; and (3) whether it was inevitable 
that the site would be circulated on school grounds.231  J.S.’s 
website was about school, it was directed at his fellow students, 
and it was bound to end up on-campus.  That, the court properly 
reasoned, is on-campus speech. 
Layshock’s discussion of a sufficient nexus between the online 
activity and the substantial and material disruption adds an 
important, albeit subtle, wrinkle to J.S.’s test.  When speech 
physically occurs on campus, it is subject to Tinker and Fraser.  
According to J.S., when online speech is sufficiently directed 
toward school, it may be considered on-campus speech.232  
Layshock adds an additional requirement.233  When online speech 
is rendered on-campus by a sufficient nexus between it and the 
 
231  J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002).  Note 
the difference between J.S.’s inevitability and Wisniewski’s foreseeability. See 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008). 
232  See J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
233  See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 597. 
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school, the entire online speech is not, ipso facto, subject to on-
campus speech standards.  The specific aspect of the speech that is 
linked to the material and substantial disruption must be 
sufficiently directed towards the school.  Consider a student 
website that parodies the school gym teacher.  Suppose, in the 
course of his parody, the student makes racist remarks, which in 
turn cause the kind of substantial disruption that could be regulated 
under Tinker.  To discipline this student, the school would be 
required to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between his or her on-
campus speech, i.e., the parody, and the disruption.  Indeed, if the 
racist remarks are part of the parody, then the school would 
probably meet this burden.  However, the court should be careful 
not to render an entire website on-campus speech merely because 
of one aspect.  A student who writes one blog entry about the 
school baseball team should not be disciplined when he expresses 
admiration for Adolf Hitler in another.  Layshock requires the 
school wishing to discipline the student to demonstrate a sufficient 
nexus between the on-campus nature of the speech and the alleged 
disruption.234  Both J.S. and Layshock’s tests are necessary to 
appropriately balance students’ First Amendment rights with the 
unique requirements of the school setting.  
It is not entirely clear that the Layshock Court consciously 
adjusted J.S.’s test in this way.  It certainly did not do so explicitly.  
However, the purpose here is not to analyze these cases for their 
own sake, but rather with an eye toward developing a legal 
standard for online student speech.  Based on this Note’s author’s 
reading of both J.S. and Layshock, the following analysis is 
suggested.  First, courts should consider (a) whether the website in 
question was created or accessed by the author at school; and (b) 
whether the author encouraged fellow students to view the site.  A 
student who makes no effort to disseminate his or her speech at 
school or among fellow students should not be held to student-
 
234  Id. at 599. 
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speech standards regarding First Amendment protection.235  
Second, the speech must target a school audience.  Third, the 
particular speech to be analyzed under Tinker or Fraser must itself 
meet the first two requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
   There is a clear tension between wanting to promote 
freedom of expression in schools and maintaining the discipline 
required for their educational responsibilities.  A standard that 
properly balances students’ rights with the unique setting of the 
school is required.  In arguing for the analysis used in J.S. and 
Layshock, this Note’s author does not purport to provide courts 
with a comprehensive standard with which to tackle the First 
Amendment issues in student online speech cases.  Like any legal 
standard in constitutional law, the nuances must be ironed out over 
time as courts have the opportunity to consider a wide variety of 
factual circumstances.  Rather, this Note’s suggested analysis is 
offered as a starting place.   
 
235  This incorporates J.S.’s discussion of whether the site would inevitably end up on 
campus. See J.S., 807 A.2d at 865.  It should be within a student’s control to withhold his 
or her speech from school. 
